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RIPARIAN RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF
THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN PEACE TREATY
I. INTRODUCTION
Many people laugh at the media's portrayal of a water-
starved, post-apocalyptic future. Yet most, particularly in the
United States, do not understand what it means to lack water.
Even in California, where a recent drought finally focused the
public's attention on the necessity of conservation, the concept of
not having water is difficult to perceive. The notion of waging war
to protect precious water resources is even more incomprehensible.
Yet in many parts of the world, particularly in the arid Middle
East, these considerations are a reality.
The Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty (Peace Treaty)' has
catapulted the issue of water use and rights, specifically along the
Jordan River, from a secretive and highly sensitive series of
negotiations to a public, international forum. The issue of riparian
rights2 along international waterways has commanded attention
for over a century.3 Governments have proposed and enacted
various strategies and agreements to establish, exercise, and
protect riparian rights along international rivers. The public's
1. Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995) [hereinafter Peace Treaty].
2. A riparian is "one that lives or has property on the bank of a river." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1960 (3d ed. 1986). "Riparian rights" are
those that accrue by "operation of law" to "owners of land on the banks of waterways,
such as the use of such water, ownership of soil under the water, etc." BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 425 (3d ed. 1991).
3. See Dante A. Caponera, Legal Aspects of Transboundary River Basins in The
Middle East: The Al Asi (Orontes), The Jordan and the Nile, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629
(1993) (noting agreements mentioning water sources as far back as 1891). The last few
decades have seen numerous treaties and international agreements established between
riparian neighbors. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Regulation of Water Economy
Questions in the Frontier Region, Apr. 9, 1956, Hung.-Aus., 438 U.N.T.S. 123; Agreement
Between the United States of America and Canada On Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov.
22, 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T. 1383; Supplementary Agreement Amending the Agreement
Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978,
Oct. 16, 1983, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 10,798; Agreement on Cooperation on Management
of Water Resources in the Danube Basin, Dec. 1, 1987, F.R.G.-Aus.-EEC, 1990 O.J. (L
90) 2. In addition, agreements dating back to the 19th century mention international
waters.
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recent focus' is on the scarcity of water in the Middle East and the
need to negotiate water rights in any peace accord.. Usually,
discussions center around the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, and relegate Jordan to mere mention as a riparian
state on the Jordan River.4 Although the focus of this Comment
is not upon the Palestinians, it discusses their situation and the
underground water resources in the West Bank in order to
understand fully the scenario unfolding between Israel and Jordan.
This Comment outlines an international policy regarding water
rights and applies this policy to the relations between Israel and
Jordan. At issue is whether international policy on water rights,
which organizations such as the International Law Association
(ILA)5 and the International Law Commission (ILC)6 have set
forth, is functional in a real world setting, particularly One in which
the highly emotional issue of water rights plays such a crucial role.
Part II of this Comment focuses on the hydrology, climate,
and historic use of Israel's and Jordan's water resources, and also
discusses the region's political history; both serve as background
to understanding the water issues in the region. Part III examines
international water rights policy and explores the "hydro-political"
situations of other international river basins including those found
in the Middle East, Africa, and North America. Finally, Part IV
compares the recent Peace Treaty, and its resolution of Israeli-
Jordanian water issues, to the ILA's Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers7 and the ILC's Draft
Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
4. Some discussion of the Jordan River Basin in terms of peace between Israel and
Jordan, however, did occur prior to the Peace Treaty. See Aaron Wolf, Water for Peace
in the Jordan River Watershed, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 797 (1993); see generally Caponera,
supra note 3.
5. The ILA is a non-governmental organization that was established in 1873.
[1995/96] 1 Y.B. OF INT'L ORG. (Union of International Associations) 986. Its aims are
the study and advancement of international and comparative law, as well as proposing
solutions to conflicts of law and striving for a unification of law. Id.
6. In 1947, General Assembly Resolution 174 (II) established the ILC, a Commission
of the United Nations (U.N.). Id. The ILC aims to promote the development of
international law, as well as its codification according to article 13(1)(a) of the U.N.
Charter. Id.
7. INT'L LAW ASS'N, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,
in REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI 477 (1967)
[hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
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courses. These policies, because of their basis in equity and
fairness,, appear flexible enough to provide the framework for a
treaty between two countries whose very existence depends upon
the water they share. The flexibility of these policies is reflected
in the fact that, although the legal principles of equity and fairness
demand one outcome, the realities of war, drought, and economics
may demand another. Under the new Peace Treaty, we see how
the threat of war and the need for peace outweigh some of the
equitable principles reflected in international policy.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL OvERVIEW OF
WATER USE IN ISRAEL AND JORDAN
A. Hydrology, Climate, and Historic Use
1. Hydrology
The Jordan River watershed is a principal source of water for
Israel and Jordan.9 The convergence of three tributaries forms
the Jordan River: the Dan River, which begins in Israel's Huleh
Valley; the Hasbani River, which originates in Lebanon; and the
Banias River, located in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights."° The
rivers join in the Huleh Valley and flow through Israeli territory
to Lake Tiberias."t The water continues southward, eventually
meeting another tributary, the Yarmuk River, located just south of
Lake Tiberias. 2 The Yarmuk River forms a border first between
Jordan and Syria, then between Jordan and Israel. 3 From the
8. Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, 30 I.L.M. 1575 (1991) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
9. Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, Harnessing International Law to Determine
Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543, 563
(1993). The Jordan River watershed and a large series of underground aquifers comprise
most of the water Israel and Jordan use. Aaron Wolf & John Ross, The Impact of Scarce
Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 925-26 (1992).
Additionally, Israel supplements its water supply with desalinated water and reclaimed
water. Wolf, supra note 4, at 799 n.a.
10. Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 9, at 562. Israel occupies the Golan Heights
as a result of the 1967 War. Caponera, supra note 3, at 641.
11. Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 9, at 562. Lake Tiberias is commonly called
the Sea of Galilee and the Kinneret; this Comment refers to it as Lake Tiberias.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 563.
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location where the Jordan River joins the Yarmuk River, the Jor-
dan River serves as the border between Jordan and Israel.
I4
Jordan and Israel have independently established national
systems for diverting water from the Jordan River. Jordan's East
Ghor Canal begins at the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan
Rivers.15 Israel's National Water Carrier is on the northwestern
shore of Lake Tiberias.1
6
The Jordan River has an annual flow of 1400 million cubic
meters per year (mcm/yr). 7 The Yarmuk River constitutes ap-
proximately forty percent of the total flow.18 The water in the
region is not only scarce but also heavily salinated. Although the
salinity level of the headwaters is quite low at 15 to 20 parts per
million (ppm), the Jordan River's southward flow is below sea
level, causing its salinity level to increase greatly.19 Lake Tiberias
has a salinity level of 340 ppm, although the Yarmuk River dilutes




The climate in Israel is quite varied. The south is arid, but
the-north receives significantly more rainfall.22 The potential for
evaporation in this semi-arid climate is 1900-2600 millimeters per
year (mm/yr).23 The rainwater that does not evaporate24 seeps
into a series of underground aquifers25 generally known as the
14. Id.
15. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 935-36.
16. Id. at 931.
17. Id. at 922.
18. Caponera, supra note 3, at 638.
19. This is because "the small springs which contribute to its flow pass first through
the salty remains of ancient seas ... Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 922.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The average annual rainfall in Israel is as follows: less than 30 millimeters (mm)
in the south; 700-1100 mm in the north; 500-700 mm in the western slopes of the Judean
and Samarian Mountains; 100-500 mm in the eastern slopes; and 200-400 mm in the Gaza
Strip: Jehoshua Schwarz, Water Resources in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, in
JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA: VIEWS ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 81, 85 (Daniel J.
Elazar ed., 1982).
23. Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 9, at 552.
24. This amount is probably about 25 to 30% of the total rainfall. Id.
25. An aquifer is "a water-bearing bed or stratum of permeable rock, sand, or gravel
capable of yielding considerable quantities of water to wells or springs." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 108 (3d ed. 1986).
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Mountain Aquifer.26 This aquifer provides Israel with ap-
proximately thirty-five percent of its yearly water consumption.27
Rain in Jordan is equally scarce. Most of the country receives
less than 200 mm of rainfall annually.28 Groundwater resources
provide Jordan with 480 mcm/yr, almost fifty percent29 of its
annual water supply.3 °
3. Regional Levels of Water Use
Currently, several riparians to the Jordan River use the
region's freshwater resources in excess of their sustainable
potential.31 Israel's total water supply is about 1800 mcm/yr, sixty
.percent from groundwater and forty percent from surface water,
specifically from the Jordan River.32 Arab West Bank residents
use approximately 110 mcm/yr, ninety percent from underground
aquifers. 33  The residents of Gaza, entirely dependent on
groundwater resources, currently use 95 mcm/yr. 4 Jordan's water
consumption is about 870 mcm/yr.35 Both Syria and Lebanon
receive sufficient water from the Euphrates and Litani Rivers,
making their consumption of Jordan River water negligible.36
26. Three main basins comprise the aquifer, located beneath the Judea and Samaria
Mountains: the Yarqon Tanninim basin to the west, which lies almost entirely within Israel
proper (this term signifies pre-1967 borders, also known as the "green line"); the Nablus-
Gilboa basin to the north, which is predominantly located in the West Bank; and the east
basin, made up of several smaller catchments, mostly within Israel proper. Benvenisti &
Gvirtzman, supra note 9 at 555-56.
27. Id. at 559.
28. Natasha Beschorner, Water and Instability in the Middle East, 273 ADELPHI PAPER
3 Winter 1992/93, at 15.
29. See infra note 35 (discussing reports of supply breakdown).
30. Beschorner, supra note 28, at 15. About 270 mcm of Jordan's groundwater comes
from renewable sources, while 210 mcm comes from non-renewable sources. Id. In
addition, there are "large reserves of fossil brackish water.., which could yield up to 70
mcm/yr." Id. at 16.
31. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 919-20.
32. Id. at 925.
33. Id. Jewish settlers use 36 mcm/yr. Id.
34. Id. The water recharge-the amount returned to the basin-is only 60 mcm/yr.
Id.
35. Id. at 926. Reports as to the breakdown of this supply are conflicting. Some
estimates state 75% of the water comes from surface sources, predominantly the Yarmuk
River. Id. Other sources, however, claim that only 320 mcm/yr comes from surface water,
130 mcin from the Yarmuk River, 120 mcm from the Jordan River, and the rest from
minor streams. Beschorner, supra note 28, at 15.
36. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 926. But see Beschorner, supra note 28, at 17-18
(stating that Syria has been developing irrigation projects since the mid-1970s along the
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Jordan and the West Bank are currently at one hundred percent
of potential usage.37 Israel is running at a deficit of 200 mcm/yr,
and Gaza has a deficit of 35 mcm/yr.38 . By the end of the century,
serious water shortages will exist-Israel's projected water
requirement will be one hundred thirty percent of current supplies
and Jordan's requirement one hundred twenty percent.39
B. Political History
1. Pre-Israeli Independence
Historically, the waters of the Middle East always have played
a part in politics. During the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the
first decades of this century, the water sources of what are now
Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan helped determine the borders
of the. French and British Mandates.' During boundary
negotiations in 1919, Zionists4" asked that France and Great
Britain draw Israel's borders north, to the Litani River, and
include the headwaters of the Jordan River.42 France would not
agree to that request; therefore, the borders of Lebanon and Syria
encompass the Litani River and the headwaters of the Jordan
River.43
France and Great Britain signed a 1923 convention regarding
hydraulic power development, which required a state desiring to
begin such a project to reach an agreement with any affected
state." In 1926, France and Great Britain entered into an
Yarmouk River, and that if all contemplated projects are finished, Syrian usage of the
Yarmouk River will increase from 153 mcm/yr to 200 mcm/yr).
37. Wolf, supra note 4, at 799.
38. Id. at nn.a & c.
39. The actual projections state that by the year 2000, Israel's yearly requirement will
be 2500 mcm and Jordan's will be 1000 mcm. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 920.
40. Wolf, supra note 4, at 801.
41. Zionism was a movement for the establishment of the State of Israel. RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1661 (1973). These border
negotiations took place after the Balfour Declaration in which Great Britain pledged a
Jewish homeland in Palestine; therefore, the Zionists were involved to some degree in the
planning process. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 927.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 929.
44. Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More
Than One State and Protocol of Signature, Dec. 9, 1923, 35 L.N.T.S. 75, 81. Only Great
Britain actually ratified the convention and, under the theory of state.succession, Israel has
acceded to it. Caponera, supra note 3, at 644.
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agreement providing for a continuation of past grazing, watering,
and cultivation rights.45 The agreement further provided that it
would not change any rights "derived from local laws or customs
concerning the use of the waters, streams, canals and lakes for the
purposes of irrigation or supply of water to the inhabitants."
46
In 1939, the British Director of Development for the
government of Transjordan published the Ionides Plan.47 This
plan supported the Arab contention that "the region's water
resources were inadequate for Jewish immigration."'  In 1944,
Dr. Walter Lowdermilk suggested that a regional water
management scheme, based on the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), could provide resources for the immigration of another
four million Jews, as well as the 1.8 million Jews and Arabs
already living in Palestine.49 The 1947 U.N. Partition Plan
included such an arrangement but, because the Arab states
rejected the plan, it never went into effect.50
2. 1948-1967
Both Israel and Jordan saw a mass influx of immigrants after
the Israeli War of Independence in 1948. Israel absorbed the
European Jews who fled the Holocaust, as well as some 700,000
Jews from Arab countries.5 Jordan incorporated 450,000 Pales-
tinian refugees both by direct immigration and by Jordan's an-
nexation of the West Bank in 1950.52
45. Agreement of Good Neighborly Relations Concluded on Behalf of the Territories
of Palestine, on the One Part, and on Behalf of Syria and Great Lebanon, on the Other
Part, Feb. 2, 1926, Gr. Brit.-Fr., 56 L.N.T.S. 79, 83.
46. Id.
47. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 929.
48. Id. In response, the MacDonald White Paper was published, which limited
additional Jewish immigration to 75,000. Id. This remained in effect until Israel's
independence in 1948. Id.
49. Id. The plan involved the irrigation of both sides of the river, and the Negev
desert, in addition to a canal from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea to be used for
hydropower and replenishment of the diverted freshwater. Id.
50. Id. at 925-30. In fact, in 1948, upon Great Britain's withdrawal from Palestine, the
countries of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia went to war against
the new Israeli state. Id. at 930.
51. Id. at 930. Israel's "Jewish population increased from 650,000 in 1948 to 1.6
million in 1952." Id.
52. Id. This was an 80% increase in population, bringing Jordan's total to 1.85 million.
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In the early 1950s, when the need for a water policy became
apparent, several of the riparian states began developing plans for
the Jordan River watershed.53 Israel announced its "All Israel
Plan," which involved draining Huleh Lake and the surrounding
swamps, diverting the northern Jordan River, and constructing a
carrier to bring water to the coastal plain and Negev Desert?'
Jordan developed a plan to irrigate the East Ghor of the Jordan
Valley using water from the Yarmuk River.55  When Jordan
announced this plan, Israel drained the Huleh swamps and closed
a dam south of Lake Tiberias.56 The actions took place in a
demilitarized zone, and Israel's actions resulted in several skir-
mishes with the Syrians.
57
In 1953, Jordan and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees entered into an agreement
calling for a dam at Maqarin on the Yarmuk River, and another
at Addassiyah, to direct water into the East Ghor5 Under this
agreement, Jordan and Syria agreed to share the waters of the
Yarmuk.59 Later in the same year, Israel began constructing its
National Water Carrier with an intake at Gesher B'not Ya'akov,
north of Lake Tiberias in the demilitarized zone.6 The construc-
tion led to fighting with Syria, and a complaint from Syria to the
U.N.6  The fighting caused the work to cease.62  The Soviet
Union vetoed a resolution 63 calling for a resumption of the work,
forcing Israel to move the intake to Eshed Kinrot on the shores of
Lake Tiberias.'
53. Id. A watershed is "the catchment area or drainage basin from which the waters
of a stream or stream system are drawn." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2584 (3d ed. 1986).
54. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 930-31.
55. Id. at 931.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. This was known as the Bunger Plan. Id.
59. Id. Israel protested against the agreement, claiming it was an infringement upon





64. Id. This is also its current site. Id. This created a two-fold problem for Israel.
The high salinity level of Lake Tiberias required Israel to filter the water. Id. In addition,
the original location would have allowed the water to flow using gravity. Id. at 931-32.
The placement of the new intake location forces Israel to pump the water to a height of
250 meters before it can begin to flow southward. Id.
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In light of these conflicts, President Eisenhower sent special
envoy Eric Johnston to mediate an agreement between the
parties." Charles Main and the TVA, borrowing from Low-
dermilk's plan, drafted a plan that suggested taking water where
it was needed, regardless of any political borders.' This plan
involved storing most of the Jordan River's water in Lake Tiberias,
with a thirty-three to sixty-seven percent split of the river's flow
between Israel and the Arab states, respectively.67 This plan
would have allocated 394 mcm/yr to Israel, 774 mcm/yr to Jordan,
and 45 mcm/yr to Syria.68 The Arab states rejected the plan.69
Israel responded with the Cotton Plan, which envisioned using
the Litani River, out-of-basin transfers to the Negev and the
coastal plain, as well as storing water in Lake Tiberias. 7° The
Cotton Plan would have allocated 1290 mcm/yr to Israel, 575
mcm/yr to Jordan, 30 mcm/yr to Syria, and 450 mcm/yr to
Lebanon.7' The Arab states countered with a plan that "rea-
ffirmed in-basin use, rejected storage in Lake Kinneret .. . and
excluded the Litani. ' 7 2 The Arab plan would have allocated 182
mcm/yr to Israel, 698 mcm/yr to Jordan, 132 mcm/yr to Syria, and
35 mcm/yr to Lebanon in addition to Lebanon's use of the Litani
River.7 3  Johnston spent the next few years negotiating the
specifics of these various plans. 74 The end result, the Johnston
Plan, provided allocations of 400 mcm/yr to Israel, 720 mcm/yr to
Jordan, 132 mcm/yr to Syria, and 35 mcm/yr to' Lebanon.75 In a
compromise, Israel relinquished its demand on the Litani River,
and the Arabs allowed an out-of-basin transfer, as well as storage
65. Id. at 932.
66. Id. Main and the TVA conducted their study at the request of UNRWA. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Caponera, supra note 3, at 640. The Arab nations cited several reasons for their
rejection, including: lack of respect for political boundaries; little benefit to Lebanon; use
of Lake Tiberias being unsound due to evaporation; and acceptance of the plan would
imply recognizing the state of Israel. Id.
70. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 932 (this would also allow for dilution of the salinity
in Lake Tiberias).
71. Id.
72. Id. At 932-34.
73. Id. at 934.
74. Id.
75. Id. Of the 400 mcm/yr to go to Israel, 25 mcm/yr was to come from the Yarmuk
River and the rest from the Jordan River. Id.
183
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in Lake Tiberias and at Maqarin Dam.76 Committees from both
sides accepted the plan, as did the Israeli Cabinet; although
Egypt's President Nasser was a strong proponent of the plan, the
Arab League Council did not accept it.77
In the following years, Israel and Jordan built their water
carriers, despite the two countries' failure to reach an
agreement.78 In 1964, Israel began diverting Jordan River waters
through the National Carrier.79 In response, Arab nations called
a summit, and several pledged to finance a Headwater Diversion
Project.a In 1965, they began construction.s Israel considered
the project an act of aggression that threatened its water supplies
and proceeded to attack and destroy the construction sites.'
As a result of the Six Day War in 1967, Israel improved its
control over various water sources.83 Occupation of the West
Bank secured Israel's position on the Jordan River and, in
conjunction with the occupation of the Gaza Strip, extended its
control over the underground aquifers.' After occupying the
West Bank, Israel nationalized the water and placed limits on its
use.8 5  Further, occupation of the Golan Heights gave Israel
76. Id.
77. Id. at 934-35. Even though the agreement failed, Israel and Jordan have




80. Id. The project involved building dams in order to divert water from the Hasbani
and Banias rivers, conveying the water through Jordan's East Ghor Canal, and irrigating
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Caponera, supra note 3, at 641. The plan would have cut the
supply to Israel's National Water Carrier by 35%, and increased the salinity of Lake
Tiberias by 60 ppm. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 937.
81. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 937.
82. Caponera, supra note 3, at 641. In 1969, Israel also bombed Jordan's East Ghor




85. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 945. This is possible because the West Bank
encompasses most of the recharge area for the aquifers that run to the coastal plain and
supply Israel with one-third of its water. Id. at 946. Excessive use and degradation of the
aquifer could result in saltwater intrusion in the coastal wells. Id. To avoid this additional
drilling and to prevent saltwater intrusion, Israel brings water from the National Carrier
to the West Bank cities of Ramallah and Hehron. Id. West Bank water is a key issue in
the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, as it was in the Israeli-Jordanian
negotiations, because the Johnston Plan called for Jordan to supply 70-150 mcm/yr to the
West Bank. Id. at 947.
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control over the headwaters of the Jordan River, effectively
making any Arab diversion scheme impossible. 6
3. 1967-Present
During the late 1970s, Jordan built a dam and an irrigation
network along the Zarqa River.' Throughout the 1970s, at-
tempts at negotiating other plans met with failure.' During the
1980s, Jordanian and Israeli officials secretly conducted
negotiations, now known as the "Picnic Table Talks," at the
confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. 9 These talks were
informal and not on the ministerial level.9° In 1982, Israel oc-
cupied southern Lebanon and, as a result, extended its control
over the Litani River. although to date Israel has not diverted any
of the Litani's waters.91
III. INTERNATIONAL POLICY REGARDING WATER RIGHTS
The ILA and the ILC propounded several international
policies concerning water rights. At its 1966 conference in Hel-
sinki, the ILA approved a set of articles known as the Helsinki
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.92 In
1986, the ILA added a section entitled Rules on International
Groundwaters to the Helsinki Rules. This new section was known
as the Seoul Rules.93 Presently, the ILC is developing draft articles
on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercours-
es.94 These policies have provided the background for treaties,
negotiations, and articles on the uses of international waterways.
86. Id. at 937.
87. Id. at 940-41.
88. Id. at 941.
89. Wolf, supra note 4, at 804. These talks took their name from the site at which
they occurred. Id. The talks were usually accommodating, with both sides sandbagging
the river either above or below the entrance to the East Ghor Canal in order to increase
the flow to the Jordan River or to the canal. Beschomer, supra note 28, at 22.
90. Wolf, supra note 4, at 805 (the only time ministerial level talks occurred was on
May 6, 1977).
91. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 943-44.
92. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7.
93. INT'L LAW ASs'N, Rules on International Groundwaters, in REPORT ON THE SIXTY-
SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT SEOUL 251 (1987) [hereinafter Seoul Rules].
94. Draft Articles, supra note 8. In 1994, the ILC submitted a modified version of the
Draft Articles to the General Assembly. Report of the International Law Commission,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 195, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
Draft Articles].
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A. The Helsinki Rules
The Helsinki Rules define an international drainage basin as
"a geographical area extending over two or more States deter-
mined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common ter-
minus."'95 The Rules assert that water apportionment should
adhere to a principle of "equitable utilization., 96 "'Equitability'
in this context does not mean a precisely equal share of the water;
it is the right of utilization."'97 The Helsinki Rules continue this
line of reasoning by stating factors used to determine what is
reasonable and equitable.98  These relevant factors include:
geography, hydrology, climate, past and present utilization,
economic and social needs of the riparians, population, costs of
alternative measures, other resources, practicability of compen-
sation in instances of dispute, and how the needs of one riparian
may be fulfilled without substantial injury to another riparian.99
An interesting principle of the Helsinki Rules is that they do
not give preference to one reasonable use over another. For
example, the Helsinki Rules would not prefer industrial use over
agricultural use."° While the rules assert this principle in theory,
in reality, two factors tend to predominate: human conditions over
natural properties, and past and present uses over potential
95. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at 484-85.
96. Chapter Two, article IV of the Rules states that the riparians are entitled to "a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters." Id. at 486. The
comments to the Rules explicitly reject the "Harmon Doctrine," which supports a state's
unqualified use of waters flowing through its territory. Id. Rather, equitable utilization
reflects the principle that "every basin state in an international drainage basin has the right
to the reasonable use of the waters of the drainage basin." Id.
97. Thomas Naff, International Riparian Law in the West and Islam, Proceedings of
the International Symposium on Water Resources in the Middle East: Policy and
Institutional Aspects at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 114, 115 (Oct. 24-
27, 1993) (on file with author) (emphasis in original).
98. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at 488.
99. Id. The weight accorded to each factor is "determined by its importance in
comparison with that of other relevant factors," and all of them are to be considered
together. Id.
100. Id. at 491. The purpose of this policy is to maintain flexibility so that one state
,,does not reserve waters it does not need, while at the same time preventing another state
from maintaining a perpetual right. Id. According to this concept, when a riparian is
ready to use waters previously unused, the entire issue of apportionment is reviewable.
Id. at 493.
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uses.t01  The Helsinki Rules also address pollution in terms
consistent with the principle of equitable utilization." They
espouse the idea that states should take care not to cause "substa-
ntial injury" to the territory of a co-riparian, and they provide
procedures for dispute resolution and compensation."0 3
B. The Seoul Rules
Under the Seoul Rules, into the definition of an international
basin incorporates waters that come from an aquifer lying under
more than one state." The Rules also state that riparians must
take into account the interdependence of surface, ground, or other
sources of water."0 5 The Seoul Rules do not replace the Helsinki
Rules; rather, they consistently emphasize that they are an addition
to the Helsinki Rules."°  The Seoul Rules also discuss pollution,
but urge states to consult, exchange data, and cooperate with each
other in order to preserve and protect the groundwater, as well as
to consider joint projects and protection measures."7
The ILA added three articles to the Seoul Rules that were
intended to compliment the Helsinki Rules."° The first article
restates the principle that a state shall refrain from acts causing
"substantial injury" to a co-riparian as long as the principle of
equitable utilization does not justify an exception." The last
two articles discuss the need for agreement when undertaking a
project requiring work in the territory of a co-riparian, as well as
notice and reasonable time for objection to proposed work that
will substantially affect a co-riparian t°
101. Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 9, at 547-48.
102. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at 496.
103. Id. at 496-505. The procedures recommended for settlement of disputes are
"reference to a joint agency, mediation, conciliation and, finally, arbitration." Id. at 501-
02.
104. Seoul Rules, supra note 93, at 251. The Seoul Rules define an aquifer as "all
underground water bearing strata capable of yielding water on a practicable basis." Id.
They consider an aquifer part of the basin even if its waters do not combine with the
surface water to flow into the common terminus. Id.
105. Id. at 259.
106. Id. at 252, 259.
107. Id. at 268.
108. Id. at 275.
109. Id. at 278.
110. Id. at 284-86.
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C. The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses
The ILC's Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (Draft Articles) define a
watercourse as a system of surface and ground waters constituting
a whole and flowing into a common terminus."' 1 This definition,
however, includes "ground water only to the extent that it interacts
in some way with surface water."' The ILC defines an inter-
national watercourse as one whose parts are in more than one
state."' The Draft Articles, like the Helsinki Rules, use the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.1 4 The factors
the ILC uses to determine reasonable and equitable use are:
geographic, hydraulic, climatic and ecological, social and economic,
effects of use on co-riparians, existing and potential uses, conser-
vation and protection, and the availability of alternative sour-
ces.
115
The ILC's Draft Articles differ from their ILA counterparts
in three respects. First, the ILC requires consideration of the
effects to another state," 6 whereas the ILA discusses compen-
sation. 7 Second, the ILC considers present and future uses, as
opposed to the ILA's past and present uses.'18 Third, the ILC
uses the concept of "appreciable harm," as opposed to the ILA's
use of "substantial injury.""' 9  Under the appreciable harm
principle, although a state may use waters in its territory, it cannot
do so in a way that will cause harm to riparian neighbors.2 °
111. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1575.
112. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles
on International Watercourses, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 395, 402 (1995). This is contrary to the
definition espoused by the ILA in its Seoul Rules. See supra note 104 (defining an aquifer
under the Seoul Rules).
113. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1575.
114. Id. at 1576.
115. Id. at 1576-77.
116. Id. at 1576, art. 6.
117. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at 488. Although the Helsinki Rules consider
substantial injury to another state a factor, the Rules balance more valuable use against
damage to existing use. Id. at 489-90.
118. See Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1577. See also Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at
488.
119. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1577.
120. Naff, supra note 97, at 115. Problems exist in defining appreciable harm. Id.
Apparently, appreciable harm "does not explicitly proscribe any harm whatsoever. .. it
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Recent changes to the draft do not subject the principle, of "no
appreciable harm" to that of "equitable apportionment"; instead,
the changes apply a "due diligence" standard so that use of an
international river does not cause significant harm to other
riparians.121  The 1994 Draft Articles, however, do specifically
address the equitable use-significant harm conflict and provide
"that where a state exercises due diligence but its use still causes
significant harm, it must ... consult with that state., 122 Never-
theless, this still does not clarify whether equitable and reasonable
use relieves a state of its burden not to cause harm."2 Like the
addendum to the Helsinki Rules, the Draft Articles contain
provisions for notification and reply regarding proposed works on
the watercourse, 124 as well as sections regarding pollution, preser-
vation, and protection of the watercourse and its ecosystem.
25
The 1994 Draft Articles do not include confined transboun-
dary ground water.126  The iLC, however, adopted a resolution
wherein it recommended that states apply the principles of the
Draft Articles to ground water usage.12 7  Interestingly, this
provision engendered significant debate 28 despite the fact that
the Seoul Rules already contained a similar provision.
D. The International Hydro-political Situation
A primary obstacle to a comprehensive policy on international
water rights law is its unenforceability. The Helsinki and Seoul
Rules, although widely accepted and broad in their scope, are not
enforceable because the ILA is an unofficial organization. 29 In
addition, the ILC's Draft Articles are only drafts and do not yet
clearly means more than merely 'perceptible' but not necessarily 'substantial'." Id.
(emphasis in original).
121. McCaffrey, supra note 112, at 399.
122. Id. at 400 (noting, "[w]hile it is clear that this paragraph does not entirely solve
the problem, it at least strongly suggests that a state's use that causes significant harm is
not per se a breach of the state's international obligations.").
123. Id. (noting that reasonable and equitable use could never justify some serious
harms, but that it would assist in negotiations or third party dispute resolutions).
124. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1578.
125. Id. at 1580-81.
126. McCaffrey, supra note 112, at 403. Confined ground water is "ground water that
is not related to surface water." Id. at 402.
127. Id. at 403.
128. Id. at 402-03.
129. Jonathan E. Cohen, International Law and the Water Politics of the Euphrates, 24
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 502, 519 (1991).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
have the force of a multilateral agreement or treaty.130  Not-
withstanding these limitations, these two policies are. the only
guidelines available for the formation of treaties concerning the
riparian water rights to an international river.
1. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers
The Euphrates River Originates in the mountains of Turkey,
flows through Syria into Iraq, and empties into the Persian
Gulf.13 ' The basin,'32 which includes tributaries, extends over
444,000 square kilometers. 13   Twenty-eight percent of the basin
lies within Turkey, seventeen percent within Syria, fifteen percent
within Saudi Arabia, and the remaining forty percent within
Iraq."3 Although Turkey's share of the basin is only twenty-
eight percent, it contributes ninety-eight percent of the river's
flow.'35 The Tigris River has its headwaters in Turkey and Iran
and flows into Iraq.136 Iraq has a fifty-four percent share of the
drainage basin. 37  Turkey's share of the Tigris River's flow is
forty-five percent.138
Turkey has begun a. massive 'project along the Euphrates,
known as the Grand Anatolia Project, which will create twenty-two
dams and nineteen hydro-electric stations.139  Syria also
developed projects along the Euphrates, and is building the ath-
Thawrah Dam at Tabqa.'" Although these projects will tend to
lower downstream water levels, Iraq uses the Euphrates less than
130. The ILC's ultimate goal is to "incorporate this law into a multilateral convention."
Id. at 520.
131. Id. at 507.
132. A basin is "the entire tract of country drained by a river and its tributaries."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 182 (3d ed. 1986).
133. Cohen, supra note 129, at 507.
134. Id.
135. Beschorner, supra note 28, at 29.
136. Cohen, supra note 129, at 510.
137. Nurit Kliot, Application of Customary International Law to International Rivers in
the Middle East, Proceedings of the International Symposium on Water Resources in the
Middle East: Policy and Institutional Aspects at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign 126 (Oct. 24-27, 1993) (on file with author).
138. Beschorner, supra note 28, at 29.
139. Cohen, supra note 129, at 508.
140. Id. at 509.
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it does the Tigris, and Iraq's planned Tharthar Canal project
should compensate for any reduction in the Euphrates' flow. 4'
Until the middle of the 1960s, Iraq made the most use of the
Euphrates.142  The construction of the Keban Dam in Turkey
and the ath-Thawrah Dam in Syria created tension between these
two riparians that nearly escalated into war, and the risk of future
hostilities remains great. 43 The Grand Anatolia Project could
reduce Syria's flow from the Euphrates by forty percent and Iraq's
by eighty percent.'44
Issues of Kurdish nationalism and the riparians' support of
political opponents underlie the instability of the region. 45 Syria
and Turkey have quarreled for years over Syrian support of
Turkey's enemies, as well as Syria's claim on the province of
Hatay.146 While Turkey and Iraq once shared flourishing economic
ties and often cooperated in their reprisals against Kurdish
nationalists, various political issues in the late 1980s converged to
cool their relations. 47  In addition, rival ideological branches of
the Ba'ath party rule Syria and Iraq, and have been feuding since
the 1960s. 8 Drought and the Persian Gulf War have combined
to exacerbate these problems.'49
141. Id. at 510. Because Turkey and Iran also share the Tigris, any increased use by
them would cause severe shortages for Iraq. Id. at 510-11.
142. Id. at 511.
143. Id. at 511-12. Saudi Arabia mediated a settlement and the threat of war de-
escalated. Id. at 512. Apparently, Syria agreed to take only 40% of the water from the
Euphrates, leaving the rest to Iraq. Id.
144. Id. at 513. In 1987, Turkey agreed' to release water at a rate of 500 cubic
meters/second. Id. In 1990, the nations amended this agreement, by which Syria agreed
to allow 58% of the flow to continue to Iraq. Id. Also, in 1990, tensions rose because
Turkey cut off the Euphrates for a month to partially fill a dam. Id. Although Turkey
promised that this was a one-time procedure, Syria and Iraq still have much to fear
because Turkey will have complete control over the Euphrates when the Grand Anatolia
Project is complete. Id. at 513-14.
145. Beschorner, supra note 28, at 27. As a result, border security is a significant
concern for the basin's riparians. Id.
146. Id. at 36. Turkey often has accused Syria of supporting anti-government groups
such as Kurdish and Armenian guerrillas. Id. at 37. In fact, these security issues led
Turkish President Ozal to threaten to cut off the Euphrates flow unless Syria ended its
support for the Kurdish militants. Id. In 1989, a Syrian official stated that Syria did not
recognize Turkey's claim over Hatay. Id. at 36-37.
147. Id. at 38. Additionally, the United States used its bases in Turkey to bomb Iraq
during the Persian Gulf War. Id.
148. Id. at 39.
149. Cohen, supra note 129, at 514-18.
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Various pressures created tense standoffs between the
riparians. Turkey's construction of the Keban Dam in the 1970s
elicited Syrian anxiety over Turkey's ability to control the
rivers.150 Syria's construction of the Tabqa Dam on the
Euphrates, the subsequent filling of the Lake Assad reservoir, and
other political pressures led both countries to send troops to their
common border."' The most critical clash, however, occurred
over Turkey's filling of the Atattirk Dam reservoir.52 In effect,
Turkey significantly reduced the flow of the Euphrates.53 The
downstream riparians complained, but all meetings and discussions
ended in deadlock 54
Notwithstanding the detail and flexibility of either the ILA's
or the ILC's policies, the Euphrates' riparians have not come to a
regional agreement regarding its use.155 One of the obstacles is
Turkey's insistence that the Euphrates is a regional, not inter-
national, river.'56 Neither the ILA's Rules nor the ILC's Draft
Articles apply to anything but international rivers. 57  Turkey's
claim that no international law mandates it to make any
agreements or compromises is evidence that neither set of rules is
enforceable. 5 Turkey's position as uppermost riparian to the
Euphrates eliminates its incentive to participate in cooperative
measures. Admission to the European Union (EU) may provide
a sufficient incentive.'59 If the parties agree to cooperate,
however, they will have to choose a system such as the ILA's
Rules or the ILC's Draft Articles.' 6°
150. Beschomer, supra note 28, at 39.
151. Id. at 39-40.
152. Id. at 41.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 41-42.
155. Id. at 39. But there are some bilateral treaties and agreements between the
various riparians. Id. at 39.
156. Cohen, supra note 129, at 527.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 527-28.
159. Id. at 549.
.160. Id. at 552. "It is crucial that the parties constructing the Euphrates agreement
choose one unified system." Id.
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2. The Nile River
The Nile River Basin encompasses almost one tenth of
Africa's territory. 16  Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire all share the Nile Basin.162
There are three sub-basins, created by the major tributaries: the
White Nile, the Blue Nile, and the Atbara River.'63 The average
annual flow of the Nile is 90 billion cubic meters per day."
Sources estimate the White Nile's contribution to this flow is
between one-seventh and two-sevenths, with the Blue Nile and the
Atbara River making up the other five to six-sevenths.65 The
majority of development along the Nile is in Egypt,t" although
some works are in the upper riparian territories. 67 Numerous
treaties govern the use of the Nile River Basin, many of which the
European nations signed during the colonial period." The most
important, however, are five agreements of the modem
governments: the Agreement of 1959 between Egypt and Sudan,
which calls for complete utilization of Nile River water; 69 the
Agreement of 1967 creating HYDROMET, a multilateral survey
project; 70 the Treaty of 1977 between Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania,
and Uganda establishing an organization for the development of
the White Nile; 71 the Agreement of December 1992 establishing





165. Id. at 650, 652. Egypt estimates the Blue Nile and the Atbara River constitute
five-sevenths of the total flow, while Ethiopia claims that they constitute six-sevenths. Id.
This and other disagreements impeded cooperation between the two countries until
recently. Id. at 652.
166. Id. These works include the Aswan Dam, the Sadd-el-Aali Dam, and five
barrages. Id.
167. Id. at 653. These works include: the Sennar Dam, the Roseires Dam and
Reservoir, the Jebel Aulia Dam, all in Sudan; the Tana Beles irrigation project in Ethiopia;
and the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda. Id. at 653-54.
168. Id. at 657-59.
169. Agreement Between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic For
the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, Sudan-U.A.R., 453 U.N.T.S. 278.
170. Caponera, supra note 3, at 659.
171. Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization for the Management and
Development of the Kagera River. Basin, Aug. 24, 1977, Rwanda-Burundi-Tanz., 1089
U.N.T.S. 165.
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a follow-up committee to the HYDROMET project; 7 2 and the
Agreement of July 1, 1993, between Egypt and Ethiopia, creating
a framework for future cooperation.
7 3
As in the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers basin, the countries of the
Nile River basin have strained political, as well as environmental,
relations. The governments of Egypt and Sudan have opposing
ideologies, and Egypt has accused Sudan of harboring radical
Islamic anti-governmental groups.'74 Relations between Egypt
and Ethiopia improved when Ethiopia's Mengistu government
ended, but the two countries still have little in common except for
the Blue Nile.'75 At one .time, relations deteriorated to such a
degree that Egypt's President Sadat threatened to bomb any
Ethiopian projects along the Blue Nile, and Ethiopia's Mengistu
threatened to decrease the flow of the Blue Nile. 7 6  Ethiopia
and Sudan have also improved their relations since the demise of
the Mengistu regime, but, like Egypt and Ethiopia, have little in
common. 177
Critics are skeptical of applying the list of factors determining
equitable and reasonable use, outlined in the Helsinki Rules and
the Draft Articles, to the Nile River Basin. 78 For example,
applying the geographical and hydrological factors to the basin,
Ethiopia's share should be the greatest because it contributes the
most; yet it uses only one percent of the water. 179 Further, the
Helsinki Rules and the Draft Articles do not address the great
water losses encountered in equatorial states such as Sudan."s
Sudan has the largest drainage-area of the Nile River, contributes
nothing to the river, and uses twenty percent of its water.'
8'
Egypt contributes nothing to the Nile River and uses most of its
172. Caponera, supra note 3, at 659
173. Survey of World Broadcasts, ME/1731, A/4, of 3 July, 1993.
174. Beschorner, supra note 28, at 58. This tension increased during the Persian Gulf
War because Sudan supported Iraq while Egypt supported the U.N. coalition. Id.
175. Id. at 59.
176. Id. at 60.
177. Id.
178. Kliot, supra note 136, at 124.
179. Id. at 125.
180. Swamps in Sudan's Sudd region cause significant water loss. Caponera, supra note
3, at 654. One estimate places the amount at close to 50% of the White Nile's discharge.
Beschorner, supra 28, at 45.
181. Kliot, supra note 136, at 125.
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water.' 82 Egypt, however, has been using the Nile River since
ancient times, is completely dependant on this water source, and
is therefore entitled to it.' 3 Nevertheless, Egypt's needs must be
balanced against the needs of the Nile River's other riparians.8
Egypt's massive usage, as well as the. great loss of water in both
the Aswan Dam and the Sudd region, contradicts the theories of
equitable and reasonable utilization and avoidance of unnecessary
waste. 85 Further, under both the Helsinki Rules and the Draft
Articles, Egypt and Sudan could face condemnation for unneces-
sary waste.1 86
These criticisms do not take into account the regional
cooperation occurring among the riparians to the Nile River.187
Although this regional cooperation is limited to research, and to
only a few of the riparians,1" the spirit of the recent agreements
reflects a desire to incorporate international policy.189
3. United States and Canada
The U.S.-Canada border contains more than 300 lakes and
rivers.'" The basis for most of the agreements between Canada
and the United States is the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.191
182. Id. The Aswan Dam also experiences enormous water losses. Id. at 126.
183. Id. at 125.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 126.
186. Article V(1)(i) of the Helsinki Rules calls for the avoidance of unnecessary waste.
Helsinki Rules,'supra note 7, at 488. Likewise, article 6(e) of the Draft Articles requires
states to adopt measures to promote conservation. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1577.
The current construction of the Jonglei Canal to divert water from the swamps in the Sudd
region should counter some of the loss and should insulate Sudan from criticism.
Caponera, supra note 3, at 654.
187. See supra text accompanying note 178.
188. See supra text accompanying note 178.
189. Caponera, supra note 3, at 662-63. "The recent agreement of July 1, 1993,
between Egypt and Ethiopia calls for the principle of good neighborliness and the peaceful
settlement of disputes; the use of the waters is to be based on 'international law,' and the
parties are not to do anything with the waters which may cause harm to the interests of
the other party." Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
190. Patricia K. Wouters, Allocation of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses: Efforts at Codification and the Experience of Canada and the United States,
30 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 43 (1992). "Water forms the boundary for more than one-half of
the 8,900-kilometre border between Canada and the United States." Id. at 52.
191. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain relating to Boundary Waters
and Boundary Questions, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 208 Consol. T.S. 214 [hereinafter
Boundary Waters Treaty]. "The Boundary Waters Treaty realized three broad goals: it
resolved some outstanding issues regarding two shared watercourses; it provided general
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 18:175
The Boundary Waters Treaty guarantees freedom 'of
navigation,"9 prohibits pollution,93 and categorizes, in order of
importance, three types of uses."9 It also provides a guideline
for resolution of Canadian-U.S. disputes.9 5  In applying the
Boundary Waters Treaty, the two countries repeatedly have
referred cases to the International Joint Commission (IJC) and,
most of the time, have followed its recommendations.'9
Article 2 of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty provides that
each state has "exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and
diversion" of water on its side of the border.' 97 Historically, the
agreements and treaties between the United States and Canada
show that they "have voluntarily protected each other by refusing
unilaterally to perform or continue harmful activities, even though
the latter were clearly allowed by treaty."' 98 This practice of the
two nations arguably shows that the IJC has not applied the
concept of "appreciable harm," as articulated in the Draft Articles;
guidelines along which the two countries could approach other, existing and future,
international watercourse disputes; and it established the International Joint Commission
(IJC)." Wouters, supra note 190, at 53 (emphasis added).
192. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 191, art. I.
193. Id. art. IV.
194. Id. art. VIII. These uses are domestic and sanitary purposes, navigational-
purposes, and power and irrigation purposes. Id.
195. Wouters, supra note 190, at 80.
196. Id. In 1925, the United States and Great Britain entered into a Treaty and
Protocol to regulate the Lake of the Woods. Id. at 57. Canadian and U.S. diversions on
the St. Mary and Milk rivers led to a dispute, which the parties resolved by incorporating
a new article into the Boundary Waters Treaty. Id. at 58. This new article provided that
the two rivers be treated as one system and that the waters should be apportioned equally.
Id. In 1950, through article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the two countries settled
a dispute regarding diversion of the Niagara River. Id. at 59.' In 1989, an agreement
regarding the Souris River settled decades of dispute surrounding apportionment of the
waters. Id. at 64-65. In 1964, the Columbia River Treaty resolved one' of the most
protracted water disputes between Canada and the United States. Id. at 66. In 1975, the
countries referred their dispute regarding the Garrison Diversion Unit along the Missouri
River to the IJC. Id. at 70-71. The UC recommended against building that portion of the
diversion that would adversely affect Canada. Id. at 71-72. During 1984 and 1985, the two
countries referred the proposed opening of a coal mine along a tributary of the Flathead
River to the IJC. Id. at 76. The IJC recommended against the opening of the mine. Id.
at 77.
197. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 191, art. II. Under this provision, private
individuals may not bring suit unless the other state's activities cause them harm. Wouters,
supra note 190, at 54 n.53.
198. Id. at 81.
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instead, the IJC has resorted to the Helsinki Rules' concept of
equitable utilization.1 9
Two-thirds of the world's treaties relating to fresh water
concern North America and Europe.2 ° What becomes apparent
from the foregoing is that states in regions with plentiful water
resources are able to establish amicable relations, treaties, and
joint commissions, whereas in "the Middle East region ...
international treaties regulating the sharing, use, and quality
control of water are virtually non-existent. ' 201  Aside from the
scarcity of water, "[p]olitical and ideological rancor or outright
hostilities have defeated sporadic efforts to fashion multilateral...
[treaties] for the use of the ... major river basins in the area.
2 2
Against this background, the Peace Treaty between Israel and
Jordan was forged.
IV. EXAMINATION OF THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN PEACE
TREATY: HELSINKI RULES OR THE DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE
NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES?
Examination of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty poses the
following questions: Upon which international policy did Israel and
Jordan rely to construct the water related provisions of the Peace
Treaty? and Have they properly' addressed all the issues? The
response to these questions is determined through an evaluation
of the Peace Treaty in light of the foregoing analysis.
A. The Peace Treaty
Prior to the peace accord between Israel and Jordan, Israel
received approximately 720 mcm/yr of its 1800 mcm/yr con-
sumption from the Jordan River system. °3 Jordan received
652.5 mcm/yr of its 870 mcm/yr consumption from the Jordan
River system as well, primarily from the Yarmuk River.2"
Under the Peace Treaty, during the summer, Israel will pump 12
mcm from the Yarmuk River, and Jordan will receive the rest of
199. Id. at 86-87.
200. Naff, supra note 97, at 123.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra text accompanying note 32.
204. See supra text accompanying note 35.
197
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the flow. 5 During the winter, Israel will pump 13 mcm from
the Yarmuk River, and Jordan will retain the rest of the flow.
2 6
This retention is subject to a clause providing that Jordan will
permit Israel to pump an additional 20 mcm during the winter 'if
Israel concedes to transfer 20 mcm of Jordan River waters to
Jordan during the summer.0 7
Additionally, during the winter, the Peace Treaty permits
Jordan to store Jordan River flood water south of the confluence
with the Yarmuk River.2' The Peace Treaty further stipulates
that Israel may maintain its current use of the Jordan River and
that Jordan is entitled to the same amount as Israel, provided it
does not affect the quantity, or degrade the quality, of Israel's wa-
ter.2° Israel also will provide Jordan with 10 mcm of desalinated
water from springs that it currently diverts into the Jordan
River.210 The agreement allows Israel to retain the use of any
wells it currently is using that now fall on Jordan's side of the new
borders.21' The Peace Treaty makes further procedural provi-
sions for checks on water quality and control,212 notification and
213 24215agreement, cooperation,21  and a joint water committee.
Jordan will receive approximately 505 mcm/yr from the
Yarmuk and the Jordan River transfers, not including any amount
that it will be able to take directly from the Jordan River. Israel
will receive 25 mcm/yr from the Yarmuk River"16 along with a
possible 3 mcm/yr of stored Jordan River flood waters. 217 Israel,
however, will be giving Jordan the 10 mcm of water it currently
diverts to the Jordan River.218 Israel, therefore, is technically
getting the amount of Yarmuk River water the Johnston Plan




209. Id. "The Joint Water Committee... will survey existing uses for documentation
and prevention of appreciable harm." Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. Annex II, art. IV.
212. Id. Annex II, art. III.
213. Id. Annex II, art. V.
214. Id. Annex II, art. VI.
215. Id. Annex II, art. VII.
216. This does not include the 20 mcm that is returned in the summer. See supra text
accompanying note 207.
217. Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Annex II, art. II.
218. See supra text accompanying note 210.
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recommended,21 9 but is giving up some water directly to Jordan,
as well as any water Jordan may be pumping directly from the
Jordan River.
The Peace Treaty appears to have appeased the Jordanian
contention during negotiations that the distribution of water was
unlawful, and that the allocations had to be redistributed. 220  It
is likely Israel conceded to these allocations as a cheaper and
socially preferable solution to a continuation of hostilities.
221
Israel had argued that the demand simply exceeds the amount of
water available, and that instead the focus should be on creating
new sources of water.222 Jordan appears to have conceded to
Israel on this point, because the Peace Treaty calls for some
cooperation to find additional sources of water.22
B. Comparison to the Helsinki Rules and the Draft Articles
The concept of equitable apportionment, as articulated in the
Helsinki Rules and the Draft Articles, significantly influenced the
Peace Treaty. Both sides attempted to apportion the limited water
supplies as evenly as possible. In this context, the Peace Treaty
appears to have favored the Helsinki Rules' factor of past uses.
The Peace Treaty is slanted towards appropriating equitable
amounts of water to appease Jordanian desires of establishing past
rights, as well as both sides' needs for water.224  The Helsinki
Rules, however, also give great weight to existing reasonable
uses.2' According to this factor, Israel should have been able to
maintain more of its current use, especially since alternative water
219. See supra text accompanying note 75.
220. Michael Parks & Mary Curtius, Israel, Jordan OK Draft Peace Treaty, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1994, at Al, A8. See also Beschorner, supra note 28, at 24-25.
221. Negotiations with the Palestinians also reflected this policy. Steve Rodan, Divided
Waters-Part I, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 1, 1995, at 8, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
JPOST File. "But the principle fits in well with the Rabin government's aim of completing
an agreement with the Palestinians on the next stage of Palestinian self-rule as quickly as
possible." Id.
222. Parks & Curtius, supra note 220, at A8.
223. Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Annex II, arts. I & VI.
224. During the negotiations Jordanian officials were insisting that Jordan be allocated
it's "fair share" of.water. Steve Rodan, The Ice Cube on Jordan's Team, JERUSALEM
POST, Sept. 23, 1994, at 2B, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File. Officials
referred to pre-Israeli independence use levels. Id.
225. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at 490. Specifically, article VIII says an existing
reasonable use should be maintained unless its continuance is unjustified in light of other
factors. Id. at 493.
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sources are a factor to consider when modifying or terminating an
existing use.226  Indeed, although article VI does discuss
cooperation in future projects, 22  the Peace Treaty appears to
give short shrift to the search for new sources of water. Had it
applied the Draft Articles' factors of present and future uses,
228
necessity would have dictated a much greater emphasis on future
water supplies. While the Peace Treaty may fall short by not
setting forth a more detailed plan for alternative sources of water,
Israel and Jordan have been cooperative in formulating plans for
the development of water sources for Jordan.229
The Peace Treaty also embodies the concept, set forth in both
policies, of preventing waste.230 It specifically states, "In order
that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may use
... excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to
waste unused., 231 What the Peace Treaty does not address is the
potential for wrangling over these flood waters. Will these waters
be used on a first come, first served basis? Or, will they inevitably
require joint management?
The parties apparently favored the Draft Articles' inclusion of
"appreciable harm, 212 and its subsequent limitation on equitableutilization. Article I of the Peace Treaty states, "Jordan is entitled
226. Id. at 489.
227. Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Annex 1I, art. VI.
228. See supra text accompanying note 115.
229. See David Ridge, Eilat, Akaba to Get Desalination Plants, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
28, 1994, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File (desalination project to
provide Eilat and Akaba with fresh water and another at Lake Kinneret to desalinate
water from briny springs); Peres, Hassan Discuss Water, Other Issues, JERUSALEM POST,
Mar. 13, 1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File (Peres and Hassan met
on March 12, 1995, to discuss their joint stance on water projects for new sources in an
attempt to solicit funds from the EU); EU to Do Studies of Israel-Jordan Water Projects,
Reuters World Service, Mar. 15, .1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EUWLD File
(EU paying for feasibility studies for two- projects); EIB to Finance ME Projects.
European Investment Bank, ISR. BUS. TODAY, Apr. 21, 1995, at 17, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ASAPII File (EIB will finance joint water projects between Israel and
Jordan); Jordan-Israel Water Pipeline Begins Operating, Reuters World Service, June 20,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EUWLD File (a pipeline provided for in the
treaty is already in operation); Experts Plan Water, Environmental Cooperation in Mideast,
Agence France Presse, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFPFR File
(study begun for regional information bank on water). Under the terms of the Peace
Treaty, Israel and Jordan are to cooperate in finding alternative sources to supply Jordan
with an additional 50 mcm/yr. Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Annex II, art. I.
230. Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Annex II, art. I.
231. Id.
232. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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to an annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided,
however, that Jordan's use will not harm the quantity or quality of
... Israeli uses., 23 3  Therefore, any harm Jordan may cause to
Israeli water needs limits its equitable utilization of the Jordan
River.
As in article IX of the Helsinki Rules234 and article 21 of the
Draft Articles, 235 the Peace Treaty protects the Jordan and
Yarmuk Rivers from pollution.236  Also, the sections on
cooperation and notification 237 reflect the spirit, if not the letter,
of both the Seoul Rules 238 and the Draft Articles.
239
The Peace Treaty apparently has embraced facets of both
policies. It bases its use of equitable utilization on the factors set
forth in the Helsinki Rules, but has limited its application by using
the "no appreciable harm" standard propounded in the Draft
Articles.
C. A Critique of the Peace Treaty
Although the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel
represents a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations, its treatment of
the water issue is flawed. The Peace Treaty is conspicuously
missing any reference to the Palestinians in the West Bank. Any
agreement must consider the Palestinians, particularly in light of
the recent Israeli-Palestinian agreement.2' The Palestinians on
the West Bank are also riparians to the Jordan River, as well as to
the underground aquifers in the region.24' Further, Israel cur-
rently supplies the West Bank with water from its National Carrier
to prevent over-pumping of groundwater wells in the West
Bank.242 Therefore, the Peace Treaty should have taken the
Palestinians into account; in all likelihood, allocations made under
the Peace Treaty will require change in order to accommodate a
new Palestinian state.
233. Peace Treaty, supra note 1,'Annex 11, art. I.
234. Helsinki Rules, supra note 7, at 494.
235. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1580.
236. Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Annex II, art. III.
237. Id., arts. V & VI.
238. Seoul Rules, supra note 93, at 286.
239. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 1578.
240. Harold Dichter, The Legal Status of Israel's Water Policies in the Occupied
Territories, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 565, 565 (1994).
241. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 919, 924-25.
242. See supra note 85 (discussing Israel's importation of water to the West Bank).
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One of the points of contention in the peace process between
Israel and the Palestinians is the issue of water.243 Israel receives
a significant amount of its water from the aquifers beneath the
West Bank, and it has legitimate fears about relinquishing control
over them.2" The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
however, desperately need an increase in water supplies, especially
in Gaza.245 The Interim Autonomy Agreement (Agreement)
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority addressed this
issue.246 The Agreement provided an increase of 28 mcm/yr of
water to the Palestinians. 247 This Agreement provides Pales-
tinians a significant amount of water and gives them exclusive use
of the eastern aquifer.2' Resources remain negligible in the
area, however, and alternative resources must be developed.249
Further, the Palestinians reportedly are seeking compensation for
Israel's and Jordan's agreement on water in the Peace Treaty.
2 50
Jordan and Israel negotiated a bilateral treaty addressing water
without consulting one of the riparians. As in the
Tigris-Euphrates basin, there are now going to be several bilateral
treaties concerning the same rivers, which could lead to continual
in-fighting. But, unlike the Tigris-Euphrates riparians, the Jordan
Basin riparians currently are engaging in multilateral talks.25  A
flaw in establishing this bilateral agreement on water rights is that
Palestinian water is now seen as an Israeli problem. As Israeli ter-
ritories, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were integrated, albeit
243. Gershon Baskin, Water Needs, Not Rights, JERUSALEM POST, July 19, 1995, at 6,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File. "The Israelis say: No changes in water
allocation. The Palestinians want full control of water in the West Bink." Id.
244. David Makovsky, Israel Agrees to PA Civilian Police Along Green Line,
JERUSALEM POST, July 23, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File
("Israel wants the means to verify that Palestinians are not doing extra drilling in the
Kalkilya and Tulkarm area where the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer is located, nor in the Jenin
area, where the Gilboa aquifer is located."). But see Baskin, supra note 243 (proposing
that there is little risk of Palestinian damage to the aquifer).
245. Sharif S. Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to International
Water Law: The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Waters, 35 NAT. RES. J. 223, 231 (1995).
246. Summary of Israel-PA Agreement, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 27, 1995, at 3, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Rodan, supra note 221. "We can significantly increase Palestinian water supplies
without hurting Israel... [blut we can only do this for one or two years before we have
to desalinate." Id.
250. Makovsky, supra note 244.
251. Elmusa, supra note 245, at 224.
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marginally, in the Israeli water system. It is highly unlikely that
Jordan will relinquish any of its newly obtained water to the
Palestinians, especially in light of its own water shortages.
Although regional talks and treaties will provide a framework for
information banks, joint management, conservation, and methods
of obtaining alternative sources, 2 they will not solve the im-
mediate problem of distributing the basin's waters.
The Peace Treaty is also woefully short of providing for the
development of alternative water sources. In light of the region's
water scarcity and population growth, as well as estimates that by
the year 2000 chronic water shortages will be the norm,253 the
Peace Treaty should have explored further, and expanded farther,
the provisions for other water resources.2 4 Although the two
countries do appear to be working together to develop additional
water sources, what they actually are developing are only the
sources for Jordan that the Peace Treaty requires.2" Serious
discussion and consideration of impending water shortages is
necessary. Alternative water sources such as desalination plants
and inter-basin pipelines require years of planning and building.
The region simply does not have the luxury of time to procras-
tinate on the development of these sources.
An oft-cited suggestion for the alleviation of the water
problems in the region is inter-basin transfers. 1 6  Plans have
included: diverting the Litani River from Lebanon to the Sea of
Galilee; transferring surplus Nile River waters to Gaza or the
Negev Desert; and bringing water from Turkey into the parched
region via the so called "Peace Pipeline., 257  Another option is
the creation of regional desalination plants. 258  One proposed
project, discussed since the 1960s, is the Med-Dead Canal.259
252. Id.
253. Wolf & Ross, supra note 9, at 920.
254. Article I of the Peace Treaty requires the two countries to cooperate to find
sources to provide Jordan with an additional 50 mcm/yr of drinking water. Peace Treaty,
supra note 1, Annex II. Also, article VI provides for cooperation between Jordan and
Israel in developing new sources, but it sets no deadlines or agendas. Id.
255. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
256. Wolf, supra note 4, at 817.
257. Id. at 818-19. But see Beschorner, supra note 28, at 25, 43 (Lebanon opposes any
transfers from the Litani, and Turkey has shelved the "Peace Pipeline" in the face of
opposition from its intended customers and because it has rethought its domestic needs).
258. Wolf, supra note 4, at 830.
259. Id. at 819.
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This project would involve building a canal from the Mediter-
ranean Sea to th6 Dead Sea.260 The Dead Sea's drop in sea level
would create hydropower, which in turn would run desalination
plants. 261 Some experts disagree, claiming desalination plants not
only take years to build, but are strategic targets. 262 Others add
that replacing fresh water with desalinated water would create
Israeli dependence on imported energy.263 What critics suggest
instead is unclear. Speaking of control and protection but offering
no regional solutions, 264 their words are empty rhetoric. Control
and protection of dwindling resources only postpones the
inevitable shortage of water.265 In light of the impending water
shortages in the region, the countries must consider all options and
bring them to fruition as soon as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
The unenforceability of the Helsinki Rules and the Draft
Articles illustrates the difficulties countries encounter when
attempting to establish treaties based on international law. The
water agreement in the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel is
an example of an attempt to glean from each international policy
the principle that works best in the given situation. The end result
is an agreement that reflects an awareness of its insufficiencies,
while simultaneously being aware it is a milestone achievement.
The Peace Treaty emphasizes the need for flexibility in any
international policy, flexibility that both the Helsinki Rules and the
Draft Articles possess. This is apparent in the balancing of the
various factors that determine allocation and utilization of water.
Future Israeli-Jordanian actions, however, must include all
riparians, specifically the Palestinians, and consider alternative
solutions. The reality is that one day there simply will not be
260. Id. at 831.
261. Id. at 832-33. Some suggest that this could be the impetus for an entire agro-
industrial complex along the canal route. Id. The Jordanians put forth another option,
the Red-Dead Canal. Id. at 831. The Red-Dead Canal would operate on the same
principles, but would bring water from the Red Sea. Id. Choosing one or the other option
would be a matter of politics or technicalities. Id at 832.
262. Steve Rodan, Divided Waters-Part II, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 1, 1995, at 8,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. "Israel will be unable to forestall a water crisis within the next few years even
if it refuses to part with one drop." Id.
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enough water, and the Middle East will mirror the post-apocalyptic
world portrayed by our media. To guard against that day, Jordan,
Israel, and other riparians must expand the current Peace Treaty
regionally and include satisfactory alternatives to the meager water
sources of the region.
Niva Telerant*
* J.D. candidate, Loyola Law School, 1996; B.A. English and Anthropology,
University of California, Los Angeles, 1993. I thank my parents for their love, support,
and encouragement. I also thank the editors, staff members, and friends, whose help
proved immeasurable. Finally, I dedicate this Comment to the memory of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, whose wisdom and vision brought peace, and whose legacy is the
courage and determination to continue striving for peace.

